This might be indirect control, like the control you could exercise over your political beliefs by changing the news sources you read.Ī second response-which Pascal himself favored-frames the wager in terms of action, rather than belief. In response, whether God exists isn’t obviously true or false (unlike 1+1=3), so some argue that you have more control over your religious beliefs. Most philosophers reject doxastic voluntarism, the view that we can directly control our beliefs. The Impossibility ObjectionĪ second objection is that wagering is impossible, because we can’t form beliefs simply for their benefits: if I offer you $1,000,000 to believe that 1+1=3, you probably still can’t believe it. Further, since it’s unlikely that atheists and agnostics (agnostics suspend judgment on whether God exists) go to heaven and theists go to hell, Pascal’s wager implies it’s irrational to be an atheist or agnostic. Christianity and Islam actually do not have the same expected value-wagering on the more probable religion gives you a higher chance at an infinite good, and so has a higher expected value. When we apply this to Pascal’s wager, the result is that you should wager for the religion you think is most likely to be true. To see why, imagine you’re given the choice between a 90% chance at an infinite good or a 10% chance at the same good. It matters even when dealing with infinite values. Ī common response to the many-gods objection can be summarized in two words: probability matters. Thus, all options seem to have the same expected value. As long as we don’t assign this probability 0, then atheism isn’t a worse bet than believing a religion. However, there’s a possibility-even if unlikely-that atheists go to heaven and theists go to hell. You might think the decision matrix tells us that believing either religion is a better bet than believing atheism. This is called the “many-gods” objection, illustrated by this decision matrix: Decision matrix for the “Many Gods” objection.Īpparently, Pascal’s wager doesn’t give us a reason to pick one religion over another, since Christianity and Islam both have the same expected value. Assuming the probabilities of Christianity, Islam, and atheism are greater than zero, we get confusing expected values. To see this, let’s consider just adding two religions-Christianity and Islam-to our decision matrix. There are many religions, and believing in the God of one religion might prevent gaining the infinite rewards of another religion. The Many-Gods ObjectionĪn initial objection is that Pascal’s wager is too simplistic. While the Wager has its advocates, there are many objections. Combining the chart’s values with the assumption that we should pick the action with the highest expected value yields Pascal’s Wager. This decision matrix illustrates the argument: Basic decision matrix for Pascal’s Wager.Įven if the chance of God existing is small, as long as it is greater than zero, the expected value of believing is infinite. The argument depends on the expected value of believing in God, which we use to make a decision if we’re not certain whether God exists. If God does not exist, then whether I believe in God or not, whatever I’d gain or lose would be finite. If God exists and I don’t believe in God, I may go to hell, which is infinitely bad. If God exists and I believe in God, I’ll go to heaven, which is infinitely good. The basic form of the wager goes like this: This article explains Pascal’s wager and considers three objections. Pascal thought that evidence cannot settle the question of whether God exists, so he proposes that you should bet, or wager, on God because of what’s at stake: you have lots to gain and not much to lose. Pascal’s wager, originally proposed by Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), takes a more pragmatic approach. These arguments offer evidence for and against God’s existence. To answer this, we might examine arguments for theism-like first-cause and design arguments-and arguments for atheism-like arguments from evil. Categories: Philosophy of Religion, Epistemology, Historical Philosophy, Logic and Reasoning
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